

1 **SARS-CoV-2 in environmental samples of quarantined households**

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24 Highlights

- 25 • With public “shut downs” due to SARS-CoV-2, domestic infection is a main possible
26 route of transmission.
- 27 • All analysed air samples were tested negative for SARS-CoV-2.
- 28 • 15.15 % of all wastewater samples (washbasin, showers and toilets) were tested
29 positive.
- 30 • Only 3.36 % of all object samples were tested positive: one remote control, two metallic
31 door knobs and one wooden stove overlay.
- 32 • This study supports the hypothesis that indirect environmental transmission may only
33 play a minor role, which needs clarifications in further studies.

34

35 Abstract

36 The role of environmental transmission of SARS-CoV-2 remains unclear. Particularly the close
37 contact of persons living together or cohabitating in domestic quarantine could result in high
38 risk for exposure to the virus within the households. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
39 investigate the whereabouts of the virus and whether useful precautions to prevent the
40 dissemination can be given.

41 21 households under quarantine conditions were randomly selected for this study. All persons
42 living in each household were recorded in terms of age, sex and time of household quarantine.
43 Throat swabs for analysis were obtained from all adult individuals and most of the children. Air,
44 wastewater samples and surface swabs (commodities) were obtained and analysed by RT-
45 PCR. Positive swabs were cultivated to analyse for viral infectivity.

46 26 of all 43 tested adults (60.47 %) tested positive by RT-PCR. All 15 air samples were PCR-
47 negative. 10 of 66 wastewater samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 (15.15 %) as well as 4
48 of 119 object samples (3.36 %). No statistically significant correlation between PCR-positive

49 environmental samples and the extent of infection spread inside the household could be
50 observed. No infectious virus could be isolated under cell culture conditions.

51 As we cannot rule out transmission through surfaces, hygienic behavioural measures are
52 important in the households of SARS-CoV-2 infected individuals to avoid potential
53 transmission through surfaces. The role of the domestic environment, in particular the
54 wastewater load in washbasins and showers, in the transmission of SARS CoV-2 should be
55 further clarified.

56

57 **Keywords**

58 SARS-CoV-2; COVID-19; hygiene measures; environment; quarantine; airborne transmission

59 Introduction

60 The COVID-19 pandemic is one of the most important public health threats to the world since
61 the Spanish flu around 100 years ago. Over 5 million cases and almost 350,000 deaths have
62 been reported so far (WHO, 2020a, data as of 23rd may 2020). Thus, the COVID-19 pandemic
63 challenges the environmental hygiene: special isolation and infectious disease wards have
64 been established in hospitals and healthcare facilities and whole households have been
65 quarantined. Hence, comprehensive monitoring of the environment of healthcare facilities and
66 households during pandemic outbreaks are vital parts to ensure patients' safety and public
67 health (Liu et al., 2020).

68 COVID-19 is a disease of the upper airways (Schmithausen et al., 2020). It has been shown
69 for SARS-CoV-2 that droplets (particles $> 5 \mu\text{m}$) can deposit on mucous surfaces of the upper
70 respiratory tract and be spread when coughing, sneezing or speaking (Anfinrud et al., 2020; Li
71 et al., 2020; Liu et al., 2020) Thus, the main airborne transmission pathway of infectious SARS-
72 CoV-2 is aerosol (particles $< 5 \mu\text{m}$) or droplets (van Doremalen et al., 2020). This is particularly
73 important regarding indoor environments, because small particles with a higher viral load may
74 be carried over distances up to 10 m from the emission source and may even accumulate
75 (Morawska and Cao, 2020; Paules et al., 2020). However, these findings are based on
76 laboratory experiments. One of a few on-field outbreaks studies on environmental transmission
77 dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 was performed by Xu et al. (2020) on a cruise ship with a total of
78 3,711 passengers. Xu et al. (2020) rebutted that long-range airborne transmission routes and
79 even central air conditioning systems play a role in a COVID-19 outbreak in a confined space.
80 On the other hand it can be assumed that close contact and fomites contribute to transmission
81 effects (ECDC, 2020; WHO, 2020a). Chan et al. (2020) proofed person-to-person transmission
82 in hospital and family settings. Currently, only few on-field studies of SARS-CoV-2 detected
83 RNA on door handles and surfaces in hospital and/or confirmed COVID-19 in the patient's
84 environment, particularly in Asia (Liu et al., 2020). However, the prevalence and potential

85 transmission risks of SARS-CoV-2 in the environment of infected persons of the general
86 population living with their families in households have not yet been sufficiently explored.

87 One important underlying question is whether and how long virus particles can survive on
88 various surfaces to enable human-to-surface-to-human transmission. To date, no case of
89 transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from human to human via food, drinking water or fomites could
90 be demonstrated, although if there is speculation that in the early phase of virus spread in
91 China transmission might be food-borne associated (Jalava, 2020). Modelling also implies that
92 the indirect transmission of SARS-CoV-2 from environment is of little importance (Ferretti et
93 al., 2020). In contrast, recent studies suggested that the environmental stability of the virus on
94 surfaces plays an important role in the transfer (Otter et al., 2016; van Doremalen et al., 2020).
95 Studies also showed that the viable virus remained detectable for hours or even days in the
96 inanimate surroundings like the air, on stainless steel and plastic surfaces (Kampf et al., 2020;
97 Service, 2020) as well as in urine and faeces of formerly positive patients (Holshue et al., 2020;
98 Wang et al., 2020c; Wang et al., 2020b). SARS-CoV-2 RNA has been detected in the stool of
99 one of the first patients in the USA (Holshue et al., 2020). This might be in line with the
100 observation of Wang et al. (2020) and Cheng et al. (2020) describing that at least 2–10% of
101 patients with COVID-19 show gastrointestinal symptoms such as diarrhoea and vomiting
102 (Chen et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2020a). Schmithausen et al. (2020) described persistent
103 diarrhoea in 32% of tested persons. Following the wastewater pathway, SARS-CoV-2 RNA
104 has already been found in the wastewater of hospitals treating COVID-19 patients (Wang et
105 al., 2020c). In a lab-based experiment, coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1) was found to remain
106 infectious for 14 days at 4°C, and for 2 days at 20°C in hospital wastewater (Wang et al., 2005).
107 Yeo et al. (2020) highlight the potential of faecal-oral transmission. Thus, wastewater and
108 sanitation units represent potential infectious sources of SARS-CoV-2 and colonization of the
109 sewage system with microorganisms already starts in the siphons of the washbasins, shower
110 siphons, as well as in the toilets (KRINKO, 2020; Sib et al., 2019). When SARS-CoV-2 infected
111 persons with gastrointestinal symptoms excrete urine and faeces, consequently SARS-CoV-2
112 can be identified in the immediate surroundings like the sanitary facilities. While the elimination

113 of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewaters is possible after treatment (Holshue et al., 2020; Zhang et al.,
114 2020), the possibility of faecal–oral recirculation of SARS-CoV-2 from siphons of washbasins
115 and showers as well toilets to humans via droplets or aerosols or even smear-infection is still
116 unclear. In order to test this assumption, the study presented here also collected on-field
117 samples of siphons and toilets in private households of COVID-19 infected people.

118 The main exposure to and transmission of the virus occurs at home (Qian et al., 2020), and in
119 cases of mild COVID-19 progression, home care is implemented to avoid hospital overload
120 (WHO, 2020b). Consequently, contact persons of positively tested people are also placed in
121 pre-emptive home isolation before the onset of symptoms due to the risk of contagion (ECDC,
122 2020; WHO, 2020b). As a result, infected people and contact persons living together as a
123 family or in cohabitation are in domestic quarantine with each other. Even with separate
124 bathrooms and bedrooms, it is impossible to effectively and permanently distance oneself and
125 maintain adequate hand hygiene.

126 The aim of this study was to investigate the dissemination of virus in air, wastewater and on
127 items within the domestic environment of family households with at least one SARS-CoV-2
128 positive family member, during a quarantine ordered by the local health department and to give
129 useful recommendations for infection prevention.

130 **Material and Methods**

131 **Sample site and recruitment of households**

132 Samples were obtained in a high-prevalence community setting with Germany's first largest
133 high-prevalence cluster with regard to COVID-19 known at that point of time in March 2020
134 (Streeck et al., 2020b; Streeck et al., 2020a). The local health department provided lists of all
135 positively tested inhabitants who had been placed in domestic quarantine at the point of data
136 collection. 21 households, with at least one person tested positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA, were
137 randomly selected from this list. The respective residents were contacted by telephone and
138 informed about the study. All persons and their family members living under one roof agreed

139 to participate in the study. Complete information from pharyngeal swabs was available for all
140 58 study participants (43 adults, 15 children) living in 21 households.

141 **Sampling**

142 Age, sex and time of quarantine were recorded for all individuals living in each household.
143 Household was defined as people living together within one flat or one house and having
144 regularly and close contact nearly every day. Throat swabs for virologic diagnostics were
145 obtained from all adults described by Streeck et al. (2020b).

146 As this is an exploratory study, no standardised environmental sampling was carried out.
147 Furthermore, no characterization of cleaning methods or materials was performed. Critical
148 rooms and fomites were identified in each household by two researchers (physicians or
149 virologists or hygienists or public health specialists) in cooperation with the residents. The
150 focus of this study was on the air, wastewater and swab samples of as many different fomites
151 (consumer goods and furnishings) as possible with the WHO “how to” guide as a reference
152 (WHO, 2020c).

153 Air samples were obtained employing cyclone sampling (Verreault et al., 2008) via Coriolis
154 Micro – Air sampler (Bertin Technologies SAS, France). The air collectors were positioned in
155 the middle of the room that was used most frequently by the residents; this was usually the
156 living room or the kitchen - all the rooms had no ventilation equipment. During sampling, close
157 contact to the air sampler (e.g. speaking in a range below 2 metres but not above 3 metres)
158 was avoided. Sampling was performed with 300 litres per minute for 10 minutes in 15 ml of 0.9
159 % NaCl.

160 Wastewater samples were obtained using sterile syringes and catheters to reach the
161 wastewater in the siphons of sinks, showers and toilets in bathrooms. Samples were only taken
162 when the sanitary facilities were shared between the residents. The air and wastewater
163 samples were stored and transported at +4°C.

164 Fomite samples were taken using a swab with a synthetic tip and a plastic shaft
165 (FLOQSwabs™, Copan, Italy) and added PBS, with 2 ml of 0.9 % NaCl including neutralizing
166 buffer to counteract the effects of any residual disinfectant (WHO, 2020c). The residents
167 identified fomites of frequent and shared use (e.g. door handles, remote control). All laboratory
168 analyses were performed within 48 hours.

169 **Laboratory analysis**

170 All samples were transported to the virologic laboratory within 6 hours of sampling. Virologic
171 analysis was performed via RT-PCR using the protocol of Corman et al. (2020). Briefly, swab
172 samples were homogenized by short vortexing and 140 µl of the sample were transferred to a
173 sterile 2 ml microcentrifuge tube holding 560 µl AVL buffer (Qiagen). Viral RNA was extracted
174 with the QIAamp Viral RNA Mini kit (Qiagen) according to the instructions of the manufacturer.
175 The RNA was used as template for three real time RT-PCR reactions using SuperScript™III
176 One-Step RT-PCR System with Platinum™ TaqDNA Polymerase (Thermo Fisher) to amplify
177 sequences of the SARS-CoV-2 E gene (primers E_Sarbeco_F and R, probe E_Sarbeco_P1),
178 the RdRP gene (primers RdRP_SARSr_F, and R, and probe RdRP_SARSr-P2), and an
179 internal control for RNA extraction, reverse transcription, and amplification (innuDETECT
180 Internal Control RNA Assay, Analytik Jena #845-ID-0007100). Samples were considered
181 positive for SARS-CoV-2 if amplification occurred in both virus-specific reactions.

182 The isolation of infectious virus from environmental samples was attempted by seeding Vero
183 E6 cells in 24 well plates or T25 flasks at a density of 70-80 %. Cells were incubated with 200
184 µl (24 well) – 1000 µl (T25 flask) of the sample material supplemented with 1x
185 penicillin/streptomycin/amphotericin B and incubated for 1 h at 37°C in 5 % CO₂. For water
186 samples, 10% (v/v) of inoculation volume was replaced by 10xPBS to obtain a final
187 concentration of 1xPBS. After 1 h of incubation, the inoculum was removed, Dulbecco's
188 Modified Eagle's medium (Gibco) with 3 % foetal bovine serum (Gibco) and 1x
189 penicillin/streptomycin/amphotericin B was added. Cells were incubated over several days at

190 37°C, 5 % CO₂ and observed for development of a cytopathic effect that typically occurs for
191 growth of SARS-CoV-2 on Vero E6 cells.

192 **Statistical analysis**

193 Statistical analysis was performed via Stata IC 15.1 (StataCorp, USA). An $\alpha = 0.05$ was
194 considered statistically significant and all tests were 2-tailed. The factors associated with
195 environmental contamination were analysed using nonparametric tests for continuous
196 variables. The χ^2 -Test or Fisher exact test were used to analyse categorical variables.

197 **Results**

198 **Household data**

199 In total, data from 21 households were included in the analysis. The profile of all investigated
200 households is shown in table 1.

201 *Table 1: Household data*

| | Total | Per Household | | |
|--------------------------------|-------|---------------|---------------|---------------|
| | | Median | IQR | Range |
| Number of households | 21 | | | |
| Number of adults (≥ 18) | 43 | 2 | 2 – 2 | 1 – 4 |
| Number of children (<18) | 15 | 0 | 0 – 2 | 0 – 3 |
| Proportion of females (%) | 51.72 | 50.00 | 50.00 – 66.67 | 0.00 – 100.00 |
| Median household age (years) | | 31.00 | 28.00 – 53.00 | 9.50 – 75.00 |
| Time of quarantine (days) | | 5 | 5 – 6 | 0 – 6 |

202
203 Of the pharyngeal swab samples obtained from all 43 adults, 26 (60.47 %) tested positive by
204 RT-PCR. The median number of adults testing positive was one per household (IQR: 1 – 2);
205 in two households no PCR-positive person was discovered. We obtained samples from 9
206 children, with 4 of them tested positive (44.44 %). There was no association between positive
207 adults and children within our study group (exact test, $p = 0.469$). The proportion of PCR-

208 positive children was significant lower as the proportion of PCR-positive adults (binomial test,
209 $p = 0.016$).

210 Environmental sampling data

211 200 environmental samples (15 air samples [7.50 %], 66 wastewater samples [33.00 %], 119
212 object swabs [59.05 %]) from 21 households were included in the analysis. The median
213 number of samples per household was 9 (IQR: 7 – 13, Min: 1, Max: 18). 14 samples (7.00 %)
214 tested positive using RT-PCR. Overall, 14 samples (7.00 %) tested positive. Table 2 shows
215 the number of PCR-positive samples considering the sample type. The observed differences
216 in positivity between the sample types are significant (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.011$). Infectious virus could
217 not be isolated in Vero E6 cells from any environmental sample.

218 *Table 2: PCR-status of different sample types.*

| Sample type | PCR-negative | PCR-positive | Total number tested |
|--------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Air samples | 15 (100 %) | 0 (0 %) | 15 (100 %) |
| Wastewater samples | 56 (84.85 %) | 10 (15.15 %) | 66 (100 %) |
| Object samples | 115 (96.64 %) | 4 (3.36 %) | 119 (100 %) |
| Total | 186 (93.00 %) | 14 (7.00 %) | 200 (100 %) |

219
220 As shown in table 2, wastewater samples were most commonly tested positive for SARS-CoV-
221 2 RNA (15.15 %). For further analysis, four wastewater-subtypes were categorised:
222 Washbasin siphons, shower siphons, toilet and process water. Table 3 shows the positive
223 samples within these subtypes. No significance between wastewater subtype and detection of
224 SARS-CoV-2-status was observed (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.700$).

225 *Table 3: PCR-status of wastewater sample subtypes.*

| Sample subtype | PCR-negative | PCR-positive | Total number tested |
|-------------------|--------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Washbasin siphons | 21 (80.77 %) | 5 (19.23 %) | 26 (100 %) |
| Shower siphons | 13 (81.25 %) | 3 (18.75 %) | 16 (100 %) |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------|--------------|------------|
| Toilet | 21 (91.30 %) | 2 (8.70 %) | 23 (100 %) |
| Other | 1 (100 %) | 0 (0 %) | 1 (100 %) |
| Total wastewater samples: | 56 (84.85 %) | 10 (15.15 %) | 66 (100 %) |

226

227 In addition, the fomite samples were divided into six subtypes for further analysis: "Electronic
 228 devices", "Knobs and handles", "Plants and animals", "Furniture and furnishings", "Foods and
 229 drinks" and "Clothing". Table 4 shows the results of PCR analysis within the subtypes. There
 230 was no significant association between object subtype and PCR-status (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.843$).

231 *Table 4: PCR-status of different fomite sample subtypes.*

| Sample subtype | PCR-negative | PCR-positive | Total number tested |
|--------------------------|---------------|--------------|---------------------|
| Electronic devices | 51 (98.08 %) | 1 (1.92 %) | 52 (100 %) |
| Knobs and handles | 29 (93.55 %) | 2 (6.45 %) | 31 (100 %) |
| Plants and animals | 11 (100 %) | 0 (0 %) | 11 (100 %) |
| Furniture and furnishing | 18 (94.74 %) | 1 (5.26 %) | 19 (100 %) |
| Foods and drinks | 4 (100 %) | 0 (0 %) | 4 (100 %) |
| Clothing | 2 (100 %) | 0 (0 %) | 2 (100 %) |
| Total object samples: | 115 (96.64 %) | 4 (3.36 %) | 119 (100 %) |

232

233 Four fomite samples tested positive (3.36 %), i.e. an electronic device (remote control), two
 234 metallic doorknobs and one wooden stove overlay.

235 No significant association between positive wastewater samples and positive object samples
 236 was observed (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.851$, data not shown).

237 **Associations between human and environmental data**

238 No statistically significant correlation could be observed between the household information
 239 collected and the detection of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in the environmental samples (χ^2 -Test, $p =$
 240 0.148). The households with positive environmental PCR results were further analysed with

241 regard to the number of adults (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.249$), the number of children (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.263$),
242 the proportion of females (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.410$), the median age per household (χ^2 -Test, $p =$
243 0.453) and the time of quarantine (χ^2 -Test, $p = 0.459$). No correlation between PCR-positive
244 environmental samples and PCR-positive human samples could be found in this study (χ^2 -
245 Test, $p = 0.756$). There was no household with PCR-positive environmental samples and PCR-
246 negative human samples.

247 Discussion

248 The results indicate that at that early time of SARS-CoV-2 outbreak research in Germany the
249 contamination of the domestic environment is negligible during quarantine measured with the
250 current state of the art methods. We could not detect any viral RNA in air samples and only
251 3.36 % of all fomite samples. In contrast, 15.15 % of all wastewater samples were positive for
252 SARS-CoV-2 RNA, which indicates that mouthwash in washbasins, body wash in the shower
253 and faeces in toilets and therefore wastewater could pose a relevant exposure (Wu et al.,
254 2020). Although RT-PCR is a highly sensitive detection method it does not yield information
255 on the infectivity of the virus in these samples. Attempts to isolate virus in cell culture were not
256 successful. Given the rather low cycle threshold (CT) values >30 obtained in the RT-PCR
257 analysis of these samples, the amount of potential virus is estimated to be too low for virus
258 isolation in general. Indeed, virus isolation in cell culture has not been successful in our
259 laboratory at a CT value >30 so far. Furthermore, several wastewater samples had a toxic
260 effect on the cells, which might be linked to detergent residues. It is therefore difficult to give
261 specific hygienic behaviour precautions but rather basic hygiene measures for dissemination
262 prevention (KRINKO, 2020).

263 With regard to the fomite and surface samples, only few positive PCR results were found in
264 this study. This might also be due to methodological problems. On the one hand, the
265 swab/transport solution combinations used could not have been suitable for keeping viral RNA
266 stable until it was analysed in the laboratory. Ideally, object swabs should cover 25 cm^2 and
267 be put into 2 ml of viral transport medium including neutralizing buffer to counteract the effects

268 of any residual disinfectant or degrading enzymes (WHO, 2020c). On the other hand, we
269 observed positive PCR results in the throat swabs that were collected by the same
270 swab/transport combinations. Assuming that the results are not methodologically
271 inappropriate, they could indicate that the environmental survival of SARS-CoV-2 may not be
272 too long in the domestic environment. The survival times of SARS-CoV-2 on various dry
273 materials for different periods of time (< 3 hours on printing and tissue papers, < 2 days on
274 wood and clothing, < 4 days on smooth surfaces, < 7 days on steel or plastic) were investigated
275 by (Chin et al., 2020). However, it should be noted that these data were generated under
276 laboratory conditions. It can be assumed that households in quarantine have a cleaning
277 regime, but even under these conditions viral RNA could be found on fomites in the
278 households. A further characterization of different cleaning systems (frequency, cleaning
279 agents, ventilation of rooms, etc.) would be necessary; however, this effect could only be
280 validly estimated in observational studies, since a large bias towards social desirability can be
281 expected in surveys.

282 Following international recommendations, air samples should be taken as swabs of ventilation
283 exits or air purifier vents (WHO, 2020c). Since this is just a surrogate for real air contamination
284 and normally households in Germany are not equipped with ventilators or air purifiers, cyclone
285 air samplers were used. Cyclone samplers may be less efficient than other sampler types at
286 recovering low concentrations of airborne viruses due to the physical stress caused by
287 centrifugal force (Bourgueil et al., 1992). However, a recent study using a cyclone air collector
288 to investigate air contamination in isolation rooms of a hospital (Chia et al., 2020) showed that
289 2 out of 3 collected samples were positive for SARS-CoV-2 RNA. Further experimental
290 investigations of different air samplers in defined environments and preferably concerning
291 general population households would be necessary to exclude a method-related false low
292 recovery rate. However, these findings suggest that droplet transmission is the main pathway
293 of transmission and that aerosol transmission plays a rather minor role. According to this,
294 droplets and/or aerosols with SARS-CoV-2 in a viable and infectious form can be formed while

295 flushing open toilets without closed lids or arise from contaminated siphons and thus could
296 become a transmission pathway.

297 With regard to the results of the wastewater samples in our study, the percentage of positive
298 samples was lowest in toilets (8.70 %), higher in shower siphons (18.75 %) and highest in
299 washbasin siphons (19.23 %). Although these differences were not found to be significant,
300 they support the above-mentioned hypothesis that aerosolization of viral loaded droplets from
301 these wastewater reservoirs can be possible. Even more, the viral load on the hands and in
302 the throat is highest and viral particles can be released from spitting into the washing basin
303 siphon after teeth brushing or hands washing. The excretion of SARS-CoV-2 RNA via faeces
304 and urine has already been described (van Doremalen et al., 2020) and could also lead to an
305 increased detection rate of viral RNA in the shower or toilet.

306 Thus, the wastewater system could serve as a possible surveillance system for the circulation
307 of the virus within several environments (Medema et al., 2020). In general, wastewater requires
308 special hygienic attention, for example with regard to multidrug-resistant bacteria and antibiotic
309 residues (Müller et al., 2018; Sib et al., 2019; Voigt et al., 2020; Voigt et al., 2019), enteric
310 viruses like norovirus or rotavirus (Lodder and Roda Husman, 2005) and coronavirus (Gundy
311 et al., 2009). The enteric transmission of SARS-CoV led to a large outbreak cluster in
312 Hongkong in 2003 (Leung et al., 2003). In addition, enteric dissemination of and exposure to
313 SARS-CoV-2 via wastewater is also considered to be a main risk (Lodder and Roda Husman,
314 2020). Therefore, existing hygiene recommendations (washing hands after contact with
315 wastewater, flushing the toilet with closed lid, avoiding re-contamination of drinking water
316 systems and domestic environment by wastewater) are considered to be necessary to
317 sufficiently control this transmission route. Furthermore, preventive and intervention measures
318 should not start at the wastewater treatment in the treatment plant, but already in the immediate
319 surroundings of the patient, in order to minimize the infection potential.

320 Conclusions

321 The domestic environment predominantly does not seem to pose a high risk for transmission
322 of SARS-CoV-2. Surfaces in the domestic environment did not show a high contamination rate
323 in this study, whereas the detection of viral RNA in wastewater of washbasins, showers and
324 toilets showed a significantly higher contamination with SARS-CoV-2, indicating a possible
325 reservoir that has not been considered so far. However, further systematic studies with an
326 adapted methodology should be performed to investigate the contamination of the domestic
327 environment and the interactions between humans, animals and the environment.
328 Furthermore, the possibility of transmission via wastewater has hygienic implications for
329 systematic prevention measures especially for areas with poor sanitation (Carducci et al.
330 2020).

331 Declaration of competing interest

332 The authors declare no conflict of interest. This study complies with the ethical guidelines of
333 the declaration of Helsinki by the “world medical association” from 1964 and its subsequent
334 revisions. The ethics committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Bonn was involved
335 and approved the procedures and the publication of the results (reference no. 085/20).

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